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THE COALITION STRUCTURE CORE IS ACCESSIBLE
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Abstract. For each outcome (i.e. a payoﬀ vector augmented with a coalition structure)
of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a ﬁnite sequence of
successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order
to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent
- is employed.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C71, C73.
1. Introduction
For a TU-game in coalitional form, there are two fundamental and strongly linked problems:
(i) what coalitions will form, and (ii) how will the members of these coalitions distribute
their total worth. We attempt to answer these questions for a certain class of games. We
presuppose some bargaining process and show that the coalition structure core, provided
it is non-empty, comes forward as a natural candidate for a solution.
Consider a TU-game and some initial individually rational payoﬀ conﬁguration - i.e. an
individual rational payoﬀ vector supported by a coalition structure for which the vector
is group rational. In case some coalition D could gain by acting for themselves, it can
reject this initial outcome and propose a second outcome. As in Shenoy (1979), Sengupta
and Sengupta (1994) and Greenberg (1994, p1326) the improving coalition D becomes a
member of the new coalition structure and none of the players in D looses when moving
towards the new outcome. We impose an additional condition. The counter-proposal
should be outsider independent: ﬁrst, the new coalition structure should contain those
coalitions in the initial conﬁguration that do not shelter deviating players; and second,
these unaﬀected coalitions obtain the very same payoﬀs. Hence, in contrast to Shenoy and
Sengupta and Sengupta, the deviating coalition D cannot prescribe the structure and the
payoﬀs of those coalitions that remain unaﬀected when the players in D separate to form
a coalition.1
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Once a counter-proposal is established, another coalition may reject this in favor of
a third outcome, and so forth. Apparently, this bargaining process turns the coalition
structure core, if non-empty, into an accessible set of outcomes:
For each outcome of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core,
there exists a ﬁnite sequence of successive ‘outsider independent’ counter-
proposals that terminates in the coalition structure core.
In the search for a dynamic foundation of the core, already Green (1974) made an
important contribution. He established a ﬁnite process of successive counter-proposals that
almost surely reaches the core. Later on, Wu (1977) showed the existence of a bargaining
scheme that converges to the core and rephrased this result as the core is globally stable.
Finally, our result is a continuation of the work by Sengupta and Sengupta (1996).
Formulated in the language of von Neumann and Morgenstern, they proved the indirect
stability of the core: no payoﬀ allocation dominates a core outcome, and each outcome is
indirectly dominated by a core outcome. We reﬁne this stability property in two dimen-
sions.
First, Sengupta and Sengupta (and also Green and Wu) concentrate on the core. Hence
they do not tackle problem (i). They take the coalition structure to be exogenously given
and assume that the grand coalition forms. We also take the coalition formation process
into account and extend the stability result to the coalition structure core.
Second, we extend the dominance relation employed by Sengupta and Sengupta (1996)
to a framework involving coalition structures. And here, as already explained, we motivate
a restrictive dominance relation based upon the outsider-independency condition.
The next section collects preliminaries, introduces the coalition structure core, and de-
ﬁnes outsider independent domination. Section 3 studies outsider independent dominating
chains and proves our result. The coalition structure core is characterized as the smallest
set of outcomes that satisﬁes this accessibility property.
2. Preliminaries
We introduce the notation and deﬁne games, outcomes, dominance, and the coalition
structure core. As we do not assume that the grand coalition forms, we use outcomes (or
individual rational payoﬀ conﬁgurations, e.g. (Owen 1982, p236)) instead of imputations.
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a set of n players. Non-empty subsets of N are called coalitions.
A partition is a set of pairwise disjoint coalitions so that their union is N and represents
the breaking up of the grand coalition N. For a partition P = {C1,C2,...,Cm} and a
coalition C, the partners’ set P(C,P) of C in P is deﬁned as the union of those coalitions
in P that have a non-empty intersection with C:




A characteristic function v : 2N \{∅} −→ R assigns a real value to each coalition. The
pair (N,v) is said to be a transferable utility game in characteristic function form, in short,THE COALITION STRUCTURE CORE IS ACCESSIBLE 3
a game. An outcome of a game (N,v) is a pair (x,P) with x in Rn and P a partition of
N. The vector x = (x1,x2,...,xn) lists the payoﬀs of each player and satisﬁes
∀i ∈ N : xi ≥ v({i}) and ∀C ∈ P : x(C) = v(C),
with x(C) =
P
j∈C xj. The ﬁrst condition is known as individual rationality: player i will
cooperate to form a coalition only if his payoﬀ xi exceeds the amount he would get on his
own. The second condition combines feasibility and the myopic behavior of the players. It
states that the payoﬀ vector x is eﬃcient with respect to the coalition structure P: each
coalition in the partition P allocates its value among its members. Outcomes with the
same payoﬀ vector are said to be payoﬀ equivalent. The set of all outcomes is denoted by
Ω(N,v).
In case the grand coalition forms, then an outcome is a pair (x,P) with P = {N} and x is
an imputation, that is, a payoﬀ vector, such that xi ≥ v({i}), and x(N) =
P
i∈N xi = v(N).
As such, outcomes generalize imputations. Also note that Ω(N,v) is non-empty: it contains
the outcome in which N is split up in singletons.
For a game (N,v), let v∗ denote the maximum of v(Q) =
P
C∈Q v(C) where Q runs over
all partitions of N. This number v∗ is called the value of the game (N,v). The value of a
superadditive game is equal to the value of the grand coalition.
Now, we list three dominance relations: domination at the level of payoﬀs, standard
domination, and outsider independent domination. An interpretation and a discussion
follows.
Deﬁnition 1. Domination at the level of payoﬀs. Let x,y ∈ Rn and let C be a coalition.
Then, vector x dominates y by C, denoted by x >C y, if
- for each player i in C we have xi ≥ yi, and
- for at least one player i in C we have xi > yi.
Standard domination. Let (N,v) be a game and let a = (x,P) and b = (y,Q) be two
outcomes. Then, outcome a standard dominates b by C if
- the payoﬀ vector x dominates y by C, and
- P contains C.
Outsider independent domination. Let (N,v) be a game and let a = (x,P) and b = (y,Q)
be two outcomes. Then, outcome a outsider independently dominates b by C if
- outcome a standard dominates b by C,
- P contains all coalitions in Q that do not intersect C,
- the restrictions of x and y to the set of players outside P(C,Q) coincide.
Furthermore, we hold on the next terminology:
- C is called the deviating coalition, its members are deviators.
Outcome a outsider independent dominates b if P contains a coalition C such that a
outsider independent dominates b by C, and we abbreviate this as a o.i.dominates b.
The o.i.dominance relation should be interpreted in a dynamic way. Let a = (x,P)
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that coalition C deviates and enforces the new outcome a. Indeed, in order to obtain a
higher total payoﬀ, coalition C separates from its partners (and at least one member of C
gets strictly better oﬀ). The players in P(C,Q) \ C become ex-partners of C. They may
reorganize themselves and their payoﬀs might decrease when moving from b to a. In the
worst case, these ex-partners fall apart to singletons. Finally, the outsiders, i.e. the players
not in P(C,Q), are left untouched.
The deﬁnition clearly indicates that outsider independent domination is more restrictive
than standard domination, which was employed by Shenoy (1979) and Sengupta and Sen-
gupta (1994) among others. With respect to standard domination the deviating coalition
is allowed to aﬀect the payoﬀs of all the players and thus to ignore the behavior and the
motivation of the outsiders. The use of o.i.domination removes these privileges.
The o.i.dominance relation also models a merger or a breaking up. In the former case,
the deviating coalition is the union of some of the coalitions in the initial partition. In the
latter case, an initial coalition is split up into two or more subcoalitions; each subcoalition
that is better oﬀ in the new outcome can be considered as the deviating coalition.
Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) restrict their attention to the core, that is, they assume
that the grand coalition forms. As a consequence, they employ the dominance relation at
the level of payoﬀ vectors. In contrast, we are also concerned with the coalition formation
process. We believe that in the context of coalition formation, the outsider independent
dominance relation is a natural and appropriate extension.
Now we repeat the deﬁnition of the coalition structure core, and we explain its relation
with the diﬀerent domination relations.
Deﬁnition 2. (Greenberg, 1994). Let (N,v) be a game and let Ω(N,v) be the set of
outcomes. The coalition structure core C(N,v) is the set of outcomes (x,P) that satisfy
coalitional rationality: for each coalition S we have x(S) ≥ v(S).
Balancedness conditions in order to check whether or not the coalition structure core is
non-empty are well-known (e.g. Greenberg, 1994).
Now, consider a game with value v∗ and with a non-empty coalition structure core.
Each outcome (x,P) in the coalition structure core satisﬁes x(N) = v∗. On the other
hand an outcome b = (y,Q) does not belong to the coalition structure core as soon it can
be blocked, i.e. as soon there exists coalition D such that y(D) < v(D). Such a blocking
coalition D has an incentive to deviate and is able to propose an outcome a = (x,P) (with
D in P) that o.i.dominates and therefore also standard dominates b. The set of outcomes
that are not o.i.dominated, the set of outcomes that are not standard dominated, and the
coalition structure core all three coincide.
The same arguments hold in case the grand coalition forms and the core is non-empty. An
imputation (y,{N}) does not belong to the core as soon it can be blocked by some coalition
D. Again, this blocking coalition D can propose a standard dominating outcome or an
outsider independent dominating outcome. In addition, D can propose a new imputation
(x,{N}) such that x >D y. Hence, in this case the conditions of undomination at the payoﬀ
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Finally, the coalition structure core might contain payoﬀ equivalent outcomes. In case
the grand coalition forms, the coalition structure core includes the core.
3. The coalition structure core is accessible
Consider an initial outcome. If a coalition can obtain a higher payoﬀ, it is allowed to deviate
(respecting the outsider independency conditions) and to propose a second outcome, and
so forth. This bargaining process gives rise to an o.i.dominating sequence. We show that
for each outcome there exists an o.i.dominating sequence that terminates in the coalition
structure core. Let (N,v) be a game and let Ω = Ω(N,v) be the set of all outcomes.
Deﬁnition 3. Let a,b ∈ Ω. Outcome a is said to be accessible from b, and we write a ← b
(or b → a), if a sequentially o.i.dominates b, i.e. there exists a positive integer k and a
sequence of outcomes
a0 = b, a1, ..., ak−1, ak = a
such that ai o.i.dominates ai−1 for i = 1,2,...,k. The integer k is said to be the length of
(or the number of steps in) the o.i.dominating sequence.
The relation ‘←’ describes a possible succession of transitions from one outcome to another.
We are interested in the outcomes that appear at the end of these sequences.
Deﬁnition 4. Let ∆ be a set of outcomes. Then, ∆ is accessible from Ω if for each b in Ω
there exists an a in ∆ such that a ← b.
Lemma. Let (N,v) be a game with a non-empty coalition structure core. Then, the
coalition structure core is accessible.
Proof. Let b0 = (y0,Q0) be an outcome that is not in C(N,v). In case b0 is o.i.dominated
by an outcome in C(N,v), the proof is done. In case no outcome in C(N,v) outsider
independent dominates b0, we construct an o.i.dominating sequence that terminates in the
c.s.core.2 This sequence will be denoted by b0 → b1 → b2 → .... As a consequence,
coalitions and individual payoﬀs have a double subscript the ﬁrst one of which refers to
the position in this dominating sequence.
The proof is divided into ﬁve steps. In Step 1, we select those players that can be blamed
for not being able to go to the c.s.core in one step. We call those players ‘overpaid’. In Step
2 we select a deviating coalition and in Step 3 we deﬁne an outcome b1 that o.i.dominates
b0. In Step 4 we repeat Step 2 and Step 3 and we construct an o.i.dominating sequence
b0,b1,b2,.... In Step 5 we show that this sequence reaches a c.s.core outcomes after a ﬁnite
number of iterations.
Step 1. Deﬁning the set of overpaid players.
Interpret b0 = (y0,Q0) as the initial outcome. Let a = (x,P) be a c.s.core outcome. A
player i for which y0i > xi is said to be overpaid relative to a. Let O(b0,a) collect these
overpaid players. Since b0 is not dominated by a, the set O(b0,a) is non-empty.
Now, we consider the collection of c.s.core outcomes that minimize the number of overpaid
2In this proof we use the term ‘c.s.core’ as a shorthand for ‘coalition structure core’.6 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY AND LUC LAUWERS
players. Within this collection, we look for an outcome a∗ = (x∗,P∗) that minimizes the
amount overpaid y0(O0)−x∗(O0), where O0 = O(b0,a∗). We consider a∗ as a c.s.core out-
come close to b0. Since a∗ belongs to the c.s.core, we have that x∗(N) = v(P∗) = v∗.
Step 2. Selecting a deviating coalition.
Since the outcome b0 = (y0,Q0) is not in the c.s.core there exists at least one blocking
coalition, i.e. a coalition D for which v(D) > y0(D). We select a deviating coalition D
as follows. First, we inspect the coalitions in the partition P∗ and we look for a blocking
coalition D among P∗. Next, if the partition P∗ does not contain a blocking coalition,
then the outcome b0 is eﬃcient with respect to P∗ and satisﬁes y0(N) = v∗. In that case
we select a minimal (for inclusion) blocking coalition.
Step 3. Deﬁning a deviating outcome.
In order to deﬁne the payoﬀ vector in the deviating outcome b1 = (y1,Q1) we consider the
diﬀerent types of players separately.
First, we deal with the deviating players. Since D blocks b0 and a∗ is a c.s.core outcome,
we know that y0(D) < v(D) ≤ x∗(D). Let i ∈ D. The payoﬀ y1i depends upon whether
or not D contains overpaid players.
(1) If D does not contain overpaid players, then we deﬁne
y1i = y0i + δi(D) ≤ x
∗
i,
with δi(D) non-negative and adding up to δ(D) = v(D) − y0(D).




|D ∩O0| [v(D) − y(D)] in case i is overpaid,
y0i in case i is not overpaid.
In words, the deviating coalition divides the surplus δ(D) = v(D) − y0(D) among its
members. The overpaid players are served ﬁrst and consume the whole surplus. The
non-overpaid players experience either a status quo or an improvement.
Secondly, the ex-partners of D are assumed to split up into singletons. Hence, each
player i in P(D,Q0)\D receives his value v({i}) as payoﬀ.3
Thirdly, the outsiders remain untouched: if i / ∈ P(D,Q0), then y1i = y0i. As such, we
meet the outsider independency conditions.
In conclusion: b1 o.i.dominates b0. When moving from b0 to b1, the overpaid ex-partners
of D become non-overpaid. In case b1 is either a c.s.core outcome or o.i.dominated by a
c.s.core outcome, the proof is complete. Otherwise, execute the next steps.
3This assumption can be relaxed. The ex-partners are allowed to reorganize themselves provided none
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Step 4. An iteration.
We denote the set O(b1,a∗) of overpaid players in the outcome b1 by O1. This set O1
is a subset of O0. We repeat Steps 2 and 3 and we generate an o.i.dominating sequence
b0 → b1 → b2 → ... of outcomes and a corresponding sequence O0 ⊇ O1 ⊇ O2 ⊇ ... of sets
of overpaid players. The next step shows the ﬁniteness of necessary iterations.
Step 5. The sequence b0 → b1 → b2 → ... enters the c.s.core in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
Along this o.i.dominating sequence the set of overpaid players ﬁnds its minimal form,
denoted by O, after a ﬁnite number of iterations. Let bs = (ys,Ps) be the ﬁrst outcome
in the sequence that satisﬁes Os = O. In case the partition Ps diﬀers from P∗, we can
execute some more iterations (as described in Step 4). Due to the selection criteria for the
deviating coalition (Step 2) we obtain an outcome bt = (yt,Pt) with t ≥ s, Ot = O, which
is eﬃcient with respect to P∗.4 The outcome b = (yt,P∗) is payoﬀ equivalent with bt.
We claim that the outcome b is in the c.s.core. Since b and bt are payoﬀ-equivalent, this
immediately implies that bt is also in the c.s.core.
In case O is empty this claim is obviously true. Hence, assume that O is non-empty and
that the iteration is unable to reduce it further. Denote the partners’ set of the overpaid
players in P∗ by B, i.e. B = P(O,P∗), and the complement of B by A.
Since A does not contain overpaid players, we have yi ≤ x∗
i for each i in A. Since b
belongs to Ω and since A is the union of some of the coalitions in P∗, we have y(A) = x∗(A).
Therefore, the payoﬀ vectors y and x∗ restricted to A coincide: y|A = x∗|A.
We complete the proof of the claim (that b belongs to the c.s.core) by contradiction.
Assume the existence of a coalition D that blocks the outcome b. Since y|A = x∗|A,
the coalition D is not a subset of A. Hence D intersects B. Let ¯ D = P(D,P∗) be the
partners’ set of D. Since y and x∗ are eﬃcient with respect to P∗, we have y( ¯ D) = x∗( ¯ D) =
v( ¯ D). Since O cannot be reduced, the coalition D contains all the overpaid players in ¯ D.
Therefore, ¯ D\D only contains non-overpaid players and thus satisﬁes y( ¯ D\D) ≤ x∗( ¯ D\D).
Use the eﬃciency of y and x∗ with respect to P∗ together with the fact that a∗ is a
c.s.core outcome to conclude that y(D) ≥ x∗(D) ≥ v(D). Hence, D is not blocking.
Contradiction.
Therefore, b and then also bt belong to the c.s.core and the outsider independent domi-
nating sequence b0,b1,...,bt enters the c.s.core after a ﬁnite number of iterations. 
In order to stress the impact of the particular construction in the above proof we give
an example of a bargaining scheme that does not enter the coalition structure core.
Example. Consider a three-player game in which each singleton has value 0, each pair
has value 2, and the grand coalition has value 6. The core is non-empty. Nevertheless, the
next three outcomes generate a cycle of dominating outcomes:
((1,1,0),{1,2},{3}), ((1,0,1),{1,3},{2}), and ((0,1,1),{2,3},{1}).
4Remember that in looking for a blocking coalition, the coalitions in P∗ are the ﬁrst candidates to
check. Hence, for each outcome that is not eﬃcient with respect to P∗, there will be an eﬃcient outcome
later on in the sequence.8 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A. K´ OCZY AND LUC LAUWERS
We conclude with a characterization of the coalition structure core.
Theorem. The coalition structure core of a game, if non-empty, is the smallest (for
inclusion) set of outcomes that satisﬁes accessibility.
Proof. Accessibility follows from the previous lemma. Furthermore, each outcome in the
coalition structure core is not outsider independent dominated. This implies minimality.

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